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The Pragmatist Skepsis as a Social
Practice
Skepticism, Irony and Cultural Politics in Rorty’s Philosophy
Olivier Tinland
1 One  of  the  most  underrated  problems  of  philosophy  is  whether  philosophical
vocabularies – and thereby the sets of problems articulated in such vocabularies – are
perishable products, whether they have a date of expiration written on their back. It is
one thing to talk deliberately in an old-fashioned way, using outdated notions for the
sake of elegance or nostalgia; it is another to appeal to words or topics one thinks to be
perfectly up-to-date,  though they turn out,  after closer examination,  to be no longer
valid. Richard Rorty has been one of the main philosophers focusing on that specific – and
quite unusual  – kind of  problem. One of  his  main Darwinian-Kuhnian1 claims is  that
philosophical (as well  as artistic,  scientific,  political…) vocabularies evolve constantly,
going through “revolutionary” phases and more or less massive changes of paradigms, so
that one have to be aware of such conceptual (r)evolutions before entering philosophical
debates  (unlike  the  “intuitive  realists”  who  seem  to  believe  in  the  ahistorical  and
perennial nature of fundamental problems, such as Thomas Nagel2). The recurring debate
between skepticism and antiskepticism may be one of those old cherished discussions one
likes to revive from time to time,  speaking in an old-fashioned way about outmoded
issues. From this perspective, it is not implausible to see the topic of skepticism as being a
dead star, shining in the sky of ideas long after the real star is gone.
2 What  I  would  like  to  do  here  is  to  investigate  the  meaning  and  the  significance  of
skepticism in Richard Rorty’s philosophy, wondering whether such a dead star continues
to shine in Rorty’s own private sky of ideas. First, we might notice what appears like a
contradiction in the widely-shared interpretation of Rorty’s thought: on the one hand,
one may be tempted to regard his critique of the classical view of knowledge as a clear
expression of skepticism towards the very possibility of achieving an objective theoretical
account of reality; on the other hand, it is also well-known that Rorty’s deconstruction of
modern philosophy as a representationalist, epistemology-centered discipline trying to
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mirror the objective proprieties of nature involves the critical redescription of one of its
most fascinating by-products: skepticism.3 If one rejects the classical self-conception of
the philosophical task, one also has to deny the significance of its negation, i.e. one has to
deny the relevance of the skeptical stance. Rorty could then be portrayed paradoxically as
a Skeptic who has destroyed the very possibility of  skepticism, not only its  concrete
possibility  in  everyday  practice  (like  Hume maybe  did),  but  also  its  theoretical  one.
Unsurprisingly, Rorty shows absolutely no interest in being involved in further debates
between skeptics and antiskeptics:
Representationalists  typically  think  that  controversies  between  idealists  and
realists were, and controversies between skeptics and antiskeptics are, fruitful and
interesting.  Antirepresentationalists  typically  think  both  sets  of  controversies
pointless. They diagnose both as the results of being held captive by a picture, a
picture from which we should by now have wriggled free. (Rorty, 1991a: 2-3)
3 The relation between pragmatism and skepticism has often been seen as an antagonistic
one.4 Charles Sanders Peirce, the founding father of pragmatism, wrote several famous
papers to deny any relevance to Cartesian skepticism and to oppose to such unnatural
doubts the fallibilistic pursuit of truth. Such an antiskeptical stance is to be found almost
everywhere, among the classical as well as the most recent advocates of pragmatism, for
instance in William James and Hilary Putnam’s philosophies. However, Rorty’s case seems
to be particularly difficult to decide: is he to be considered an opponent or an accomplice
of skepticism? On the one hand, in his first book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty
is clearly undertaking to overcome modern skepticism by linking it to a set of theoretical
commitments which give rise, at the beginning of the 17th century, to “epistemology as
first  philosophy.”  Thus  understood,  modern  skepticism  should  fade  away  with  the
theoretical  context  it  belongs  to,  in  favor  of  a  social  pragmatist  and  anti-
representationalist  view of  philosophy.  On the other hand,  in his  second major book
Contingency,  Irony  and  Solidarity,  Rorty  sketches  a  new intellectual  figure,  the  “liberal
ironist,” who looks very much like a Humean “mitigated” skeptic, continuingly doubting
the  validity  of  her  own  beliefs  and  the  relevance  of  her  “final  vocabularies,”  even
including reflective doubts about her own doubts.  This new figure seems to create a
tension, if not a contradiction, between Rorty’s alleged commitment to pragmatism and
such an attraction to one of the main illustrations of modern skepticism. What I want to
do in this paper is to provide a brief presentation of this tension between pragmatism and
skepticism  in  Rorty’s  philosophy.  I  shall  then  try  to  show  that  there  is  in  fact  no
contradiction between these  two commitments:  in  spite  of  appearances,  the  Rortyan
ironist is not a regression to a pre-pragmatic stance, it is rather a “conceptual character”
of sorts,  playing a role in a wider philosophical context in which skepticism is to be
overcome by its integration into a social pragmatist view. I shall finally try to show that
Rorty’s complex relation to skepticism may be a good way to consider a new type of
skepsis,  beyond  the  rigid  (and quite  unproductive)  opposition  of  pragmatism  and
skepticism, namely a pragmatic skepsis emancipated from the perishable vocabulary of
modern  skepticism,  actively  engaged  in  social  and  political  debates  involving  rival
descriptions of human culture.
4 My claim will be the following: in his attempt to connect skepticism to the emergence of
modern epistemology, Rorty seems to reduce skepticism to its theoretical side, failing to
provide a complete account of this philosophical option. We might then be tempted to see
the  practical  side  of  skepticism  as  the  “return  of  the  repressed”  in  Rorty’s  later
philosophy,  especially when he depicts  the controversial  figure of  the liberal  ironist.
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However, I would like to show that such a view is misleading, since it fails to take account
of  Rorty’s  redefinition  of  the  philosophical  discourse  under  the  bewildering  label  of
“cultural politics.”
 
I. Representationalism and Skepticism
5 In his book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, and in particular in the second part of the
book named “Mirroring,” Rorty aims at uncovering a quite unnoticed link between a
certain conception of philosophy as “epistemology” (or Erkenntnistheorie) and the rise of
modern  skepticism.  What he  has  in  mind  (to  use  Michael  Williams  labels)  isn’t  a
“therapeutic  diagnosis”  which sees  skepticism as  a  pseudo-problem which has  to  be
dissolved, but rather a “theoretical diagnosis” which considers modern skepticism – “the
specifically  ‘Cartesian’  form  of  skepticism  which  invokes  the  ‘veil  of  ideas’  as  a
justification for a skeptical attitude”5 – to be a set of genuine problems depending on a
specific theoretical context that has to be questioned. I won’t examine Rorty’s argument
in detail but will rather sum up the core ideas of his historical reconstruction of modern
epistemology in order to make explicit some problems it involves regarding skepticism.
6 Let  me  first  give  a  concise  overview  on  Rorty’s  genealogical  narrative  about  the
emergence of  epistemology as  first  philosophy:6 since  the 17th century,  people  have
thought of knowledge as a “problem” about which they ought to have a “theory” because
they  saw knowledge  as  an  “assemblage  of  representations,”  or  as  a  set  of  thoughts
mirroring (more or less accurately) the objective reality of nature. Descartes and Locke
conceive of  the mind as the new ground of  philosophy.  This field of  investigation is
“prior” to the other ones in at least two respects: a) since we can perceive the external
world only through the mind (sensations, ideas), we have to know the mind in order to
know the world; b) unlike our access to the external world, the access to the mind is
direct, immediate, providing a genuine “certainty” rather than fallible “opinion.” Thus
understood, the mind becomes the subject matter of a distinct science – the “science of
man” as opposed to “natural philosophy” – which deals with the outer world. Focusing on
“what we can know by studying how our mind worked” gives birth to “epistemology”:
this self-reflective science appears first as empiricism (Locke) but soon evolves into a
non-empirical science, thus avoiding the risk of losing the strict demarcation between
absolute  certainty  and  mere  opinion.  Kant  is  the  one  who  succeeds  in  turning  the
empiricist conception of epistemology into a non-empirical (a priori) task by internalizing
the laws of nature as grounded in the “constituting transcendental ego.” Epistemology
becomes then a “foundational science” capable of discovering the essential features of
human knowledge prior to any investigation of the external world. After the Kantian
revolution,  historians of  philosophy project  its  core question “how is  our knowledge
possible?” back onto pre-Kantian philosophy, not only onto the thinkers of the 17th and
18th centuries, but onto the ancients as well. Such a retrospective illusion makes possible
the  unification  of  philosophy  under  the  label  of  “epistemology.”  The  picture  of
“epistemology  and  metaphysics”  as  the  center  of  philosophy  is  the  outcome  of  the
representationalist view of the relation between mind and world: now the mind is seen as
a set of ideas mirroring the world which makes possible the identification of philosophy
with the theoretical elucidation of such a relation.
7 The  core  idea  of  Rorty’s  diagnosis  is  the  following:  contrary  to  other  recent
interpretations of skepticism (such as that proposed by Barry Stroud in The Significance of
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philosophical  Scepticism7), Rorty  thinks that  the  skeptical  stance  does  not  “appeal  to
something  deep  in  our  nature”  but  is  a  mere  by-product  of  the  representationalist
conception of philosophy as epistemology. According to this view, skepticism is not to be
seen as independent of the theoretical framework of epistemology, since its main concern
is the possibility to bridge the gap between mind and world or to rip the “veil of ideas”
that keep us away from the “real” world:
The  veil-of-ideas  epistemology  which  took  over  philosophy  in  the  seventeenth
century  transformed  skepticism  from  an  academic  curiosity  (Pyrrhonian
skepticism) and a concrete and local theological issue (the authority of the church
versus  the individual  reader  of  Scripture)  into a  cultural  tradition.  It  did  so  by
giving rise to a new philosophical  genre – the system which brings subject  and
object  together  again.  This  reconciliation  has  been  the  goal  of  philosophical
thought ever since. (Rorty, 1979: 113)
8 The skeptical threat of “losing the world” is thus dependent upon the modern picture of
the mind as an “inner” substance trying to reach an “outer” reality.8 If one gives up the
framework of what Rorty names the “glassy essence” of mind (for instance in favor of a
pragmatic or “behavioristic” conception of language and beliefs),  skepticism vanishes
instantly  like  a  theoretical  ghost.  In  other  words,  skepticism is  not  a  real  and  pre-
philosophical problem one would have to solve, but rather a philosophical delusion one
ought to dispel: if one manages to resist the strong attraction of the representationalist
picture of mind and its close ally, the conception of philosophy as an internal and a priori
investigation of the mind, then the problem of skepticism simply fades away.
9 Of  course,  it  is  obvious  that  such  a  claim about  modern  philosophy  in  general  and
skepticism in particular is  highly controversial.  Many objections might be mentioned
here, but I will focus on one that seems to me most relevant to my topic: Rorty’s emphasis
on modern skepticism prevents him from connect early modern skepticism to ancient
skepticism and hence to notice the persistence of a practical concern in both cases. Such a
connection would allow us to see that skepticism has as much to do with practice as it has
to do with theory:9 Pyrrho’s case, for instance, is very interesting because his skeptical
stance has much more to do with practical issues (how to free the human soul from
worries and reach the spiritual autarkeia…) than theoretical ones. Of course, Rorty is fully
aware of the shift of meaning between ancient and modern skepticism; in PMN, he writes:
Whereas skepticism in the ancient world had been a matter of a moral attitude, a
style of life, a reaction to the pretensions of the intellectual fashions of the day,
skepticism in the manner of Descartes’s First Meditations was a perfectly definite,
precise,  ‘professional’  question: How do we know that anything which is mental
represents anything which is not mental? How do we know whether what the Eye of
the Mind sees is a mirror (even a distorted mirror- an enchanted glass) or a veil?
(Rorty, 1979: 46)
10 Nevertheless,  such  a  clear  awareness  of  the  contrast  between  ancient  and  modern
skepticism doesn’t prevent Rorty from neglecting the practical side of modern skepticism.
Too eager to portray modern philosophy as solely focused on epistemological problems,
Rorty fails to recognize the existence of an essential link between theory and practice in
such modern philosophy, ignoring major skeptical figures such as Montaigne or Pierre
Bayle, as well as neglecting the practical (moral, religious, political) side of Descartes and
Locke’s  focus  on the mind.  Rorty  is  thus  unable  to  provide a  convincing account  of
modern skepticism’s motivation.
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11 Here, we can see one of the major contradictions of the young Rorty’s conception of
philosophy: his critique of modern philosophy shares the same defect as its subject (what
he calls “a sort of prolegomenon to a history of epistemology-centered philosophy as an
episode in the history of European culture” (Rorty, 1979: 390), namely too narrow a focus
on theoretical philosophy at the expense of the practical philosophy. It is quite ironic that
Rorty, at the same time as he seeks to show, in a pragmatist vein, that philosophy has
much more to do with practical issues than it appears, also fails at the same time to deal
with the complex connection between the skepticisms theoretical and moral sides in his
own historical narrative. In his reply to Michael Williams, he recognizes such a limit of
his inquiry but doesn’t seem to be fully aware of its wider philosophical consequences:
Like too many other contemporary writers on the history of philosophy, I thought
that it was enough to grasp interaction of scientific and philosophical change. I did
not  see  the need to  bring in  the changes  in  moral  and political  thought  which
resulted from the interaction of scientific and religious changes with one another.
(…) The traditional  insistence that  ‘metaphysics  and epistemology’  make up the
‘core’  of  philosophy has given us histories  of  philosophy which marginalize the
history of ethics. (Rorty, 2000: 214 and 218, n. 4).
12 This  one-sided  focus  on  the  theoretical  side  of  skepticism  could  have  serious
consequences, not only from the perspective of the history of philosophy, but with regard
to Rorty’s later philosophy. Failing to recognize the importance of practical concerns in
modern skepticism seems to undermine Rorty’s diagnosis of the “death of epistemology”
and the account of skepticism that goes with it. This is the issue I would like to address in
the next section by examining Rorty’s successor figure to skepticism: liberal irony.
 
II. Irony and Skepticism
13 Having finished reading Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, one might be convinced that
skepticism is indeed a perishable intellectual product that ought not to be part of the
philosophical conversation anymore. This may be thought to be so because skepticism
shares the same destiny as the flawed philosophical framework upon which it has been
living as an intellectual parasite: modern epistemology seen as a foundational, mentalist,
representationalist  undertaking.  However,  this  impression  quickly  fades  as  once  one
turns Rorty’s second major book, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity.  There from the very
beginning Rorty draws the reader’s attention to what might be seen as a new and more
sophisticated figure of the skeptic: the liberal ironist.
14 Such a new and more comprehensive figure might also be called the “post-Nietzschean
skeptic” and can be seen as the result of the crisis of the modern project of epistemology:
if  the project of grounding knowledge of nature on the understanding of a universal
human nature falls apart, then representationalist skepticism has to be abandoned in
favor of a new kind of skepticism, a skepticism focused not on our relation to the external
world, but on the very core of epistemology as first philosophy, namely the ideal of a
common and permanent human nature transcending every social and historical context
and grounding the possibility of genuine knowledge. The rise of this new skepticism first
gives  birth  to  anti-universalist  and  anti-social  skeptics  –  what  a  Rortyan  may  call
“unreflective” skeptics – which reject social solidarity after having merely replaced the
metaphysical ideal of a universal human nature by a pessimistic account of what lies
beneath collective life:
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Skeptics like Nietzsche have urged that metaphysics and theology are transparent
attempts  to  make  altruism  look  more  reasonable  than  it  is.  Yet  such  skeptics
typically have their own theories of human nature. They, too, claim that there is
something  common  to  all  human  beings  –  for  example,  the  will  to  power,  or
libidinal impulses. Their point is that at the ‘deepest’ level of the self there is no
sense of human solidarity, that this sense is a ‘mere’ artifact of human socialization.
So such skeptics become antisocial.  They turn their backs on the very idea of a
community larger than a tiny circle of initiates. (Rorty, 1989: xiii)
15 After having deconstructed the epistemological basis of skepticism, Rorty’s new challenge
consists  in  accepting  the  theoretical  premises  of post-nietzschean  skepticism  (the
impossibility of a transcendental foundation of human nature) without accepting their
unfortunate  practical  consequences  (the  rejection  of  social  solidarity).  According  to
Rorty,  historicist thinkers such as Hegel or Dewey help us to recognize,  against such
unfriendly forms of Romanticism, that “there is  nothing ‘beneath’  socialization or prior to
history which is definatory of the human” (Rorty, 1989: xiii), helping us not to fall into the
skeptical antisocial attitude.
16 According to Rorty, there are two parallel but equally unsatisfactory ways of dealing with
the connection between the individual quest for fulfillment and the collective task of
creating solidarity: on the one hand there are the metaphysicians who tend to reduce the
individual task to a mere epiphenomena of a universal human nature, whereas on the
other hand there are the post-nietzschean skeptics who tend to reduce social life to a
collective  lie  based  on  false  metaphysics  that  must  be  overcome  by  individual  self-
creation. Both sides tend to underestimate the distinction between the private and the
public and to extend their universalist or idiosyncratic program to both spheres, each
falling into fatal contradictions: while the metaphysicians fail to turn their universalist
political  agenda  into  a  rational  justification,  the  skeptics  fail  to  export  their  anti-
universalist doubts in the public life without threatening to jeopardize the very basis of
the society which makes possible freedom of thought. In opposition to both, Rorty thinks
that we must “drop the demand for a theory which unifies the public and private, and
[be] content to treat the demands of self-creation and of human solidarity as equally
valid, yet forever incommensurable” (Rorty, 1989: xv). The new skeptical figure which
exemplifies  such  a  biperspectival  view is  embodied  by  what  Rorty  calls  the  “liberal
ironist,” a skeptic who, like the Humean mitigated skeptic, is skeptical about her own
skepticism, about the public legitimacy of her own private motives, about the universal
scope of her own personal doubts:
I use “ironist” to name the sort of person who faces up to the contingency of his or
her  own most  central  beliefs  and desires  –  someone sufficiently  historicist  and
nominalist to have abandoned the idea that those central beliefs and desires refer
back to something beyond the reach of time and chance. (Rorty, 1989: xv)
17 Here  we  can  see  that  Rorty  forges  a  far  more  interesting  skeptical  figure  than  in
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature: the ironist is not someone detached from any practical
context,  who  relies  on  some  kind  of  naïve  epistemological  realism  (to  use  Michael
Williams’ words again) but someone who is fully aware of the contingency of her own
stance,  of  the  contingency  of  skepticism itself,  which is  nothing  more  than a  “final
vocabulary”  among  other  vocabularies.  Rorty  gives  us  this  striking  portrayal  of  the
ironist:
I  shall  define an “ironist”  as  someone who fulfills  three conditions:  (1)  She has
radical  and  continuing  doubts  about  the  final  vocabulary  she  currently  uses,
because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final
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by people or books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that argument phrased in
her  present  vocabulary  can  neither  underwrite  nor  dissolve  these  doubts;  (3)
insofar  as  she  philosophizes  about  her  situation,  she  does  not  think  that  her
vocabulary is  closer to reality than others,  that it  is  in touch with a power not
herself.  Ironists  who  are  inclined  to  philosophize  see  the  choice  between
vocabularies as made neither within a neutral and universal metavocabulary nor by
an attempt to fight one’s way past appearances to the real, but simply by playing
the new off against the old. (Ibid.: 73)
18 Rorty’s solution to the contradiction between irony and solidarity is what Nancy Fraser
calls “the partition position” (Fraser, 1990: 311): facing the impossibility of harmonizing
the incompatible requirements of romantic self-creation and pragmatic solidarity, Rorty
decides to “bifurcate the map of culture down the middle,” rephrasing Pyrrhonian or
Humean biperspectivalism as a sharp boundary between private skepticism and public
commitment to liberal institutions. Even if public skepticism threatens to lead to political
disasters, private irony can remain a possibility supported (and should be encouraged) by
political liberalism. The ironist looks therefore very much like the Humean skeptic: her
radical doubts are constantly mitigated by her everyday involvement in public liberal life.
19 Such  a  new  understanding  of  skepticism  as  private  irony  is  definitely  more
comprehensive than the former one, which was exclusively focused on the theoretical
problem of epistemology. However, one might wonder whether Rorty’s successor figure
of skepticism is consistent with his deep pragmatist commitments. Here we can refer
usefully to Michael Williams’ objections in his article “Rorty on Knowledge and truth”
(Williams, 2003):  one has to distinguish between two forms of skepticism, a mild one
which  is  compatible  with  pragmatic  commitments,  and  a  radical  one  which  is
incompatible with them. The “mild form of skepticism,” called “fallibilism,” amounts to
the thought that our beliefs are not absolutely certain and may therefore be subject to
revision. Such a form a skepticism is perfectly compatible with pragmatism, as we can see
in Peirce or Dewey’s conception of inquiry. As a pragmatist, Rorty should be committed
only to fallibilism: it may then come as a surprise to see him espouse views which seem
very  close  to  a  far  more  radical  form  of  skepticism.  The  ironist,  claims  Rorty,  has
continuous doubts about her final vocabularies, which means that she is aware of the
impossibility of justifying her ultimate commitments in a non-circular way, i.e. without
having to face the challenge of Agrippan skepticism. Such a worry seems to be at odds
with  Rorty’s  pragmatist  holistic  Davidsonian  view  of  beliefs:  having  beliefs  implies
mastering a language, which implies having mostly right beliefs about the world. Rorty’s
conception of irony seems thus to be a regression to a pre-pragmatic view of beliefs
which  threatens  to  reactivate  outdated  those  aporias  linked  to  a  foundationalist
conception of  truth.  From a consistent  pragmatist  point  of  view,  being aware of  the
contingency of our vocabularies shouldn’t lead to irony, but to a mere fallibilistic account
of the evolution of knowledge, for instance the one we find in Peirce, Dewey or even in
the explicitly pragmatist texts of Rorty.
20 So depicted, Rorty’s further conception of skepticism seems to be as unsatisfying as the
former  one.  However,  this  way  of  putting  Rorty’s  account  seems  both  unfair  and
inaccurate. Indeed, as one can easily see, when Rorty speaks of irony, he never uses the
word “skeptic” and for good reasons, as I will now argue. In an important footnote of
Unnatural Doubts, Michael Williams suggests that such an omission shouldn’t prevent the
reader to replace one word with another: “Though Rorty prefers ‘irony’ to ‘scepticism’,
taking himself to have moved beyond all traditional epistemological options, the true
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irony may be that Rorty’s ironist is everyone else’s sceptic.”10 What I would like to show
by  way  of  conclusion  is  that  such  an  equivalence,  though  tempting,  is  misleading,
missing, as it does, Rorty’s point about the status of philosophical skepsis.
 
III. Cultural Politics and Skepticism
21 It is worth noting that even in his last works Rorty continues to view the skeptic as an
anachronistic figure that has to be overcome: “a culture in which we no longer took the
skeptic’s question about whether we are getting nearer to truth would be better than the
one in which we ask the philosophy professors to assure us that we are indeed doing so.”
11 Such a continued emphasis on the pointlessness of philosophical skepticism may shed a
new light on the figure of the liberal ironist previously sketched in Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity: instead of seeing the liberal ironist as a mere return of the repressed practical
side of skepticism, this figure may in fact look more like a transitional figure towards a
redefinition  of  philosophy  as  a  form  of  social  practice,  one  that  is  moreover  fully
emancipated from the skeptic/antiskeptic debate.  Such a figure is  given an explicitly
practical gloss in Rorty’s last works in the form of the phrase “philosophy as cultural
politics.” The phrase is defined by Rorty as a philosophical practice focusing on the shifts
of vocabularies in cultural history, allowing to help changing the way we use words or
“getting rid of whole topics of discourse.”12
22 Such a  restatement  of  the  philosophical  task takes  the  metaphilosophical  movement
already at work in the shift from modern skepticism to liberal irony to a higher level of
self-reflection:  whereas  the  ironist,  having  learned  from  the  failure  of  modern
epistemology, is fully aware of the contingency of her own final commitments, including
her own doubts about such commitments, the cultural politician is fully aware that the
ironist is just another role (or a dramatized conceptual device) she has created among
many possibilities, fulfilling a definite function inside a definite philosophical agenda.
Such a device is an “incarnated vocabulary” which helps Rorty to rid philosophy of the
boring drama that is philosophical skepticism: “Interventions in cultural politics have
sometimes taken the form of proposals for new roles that men and women might play:
the  ascetic,  the  prophet,  the  dispassionate  seeker  after  truth,  the  good  citizen,  the
aesthete, the revolutionary.”13 Understood from the metaphilosophical point of view of
the cultural politician, the liberal ironist is not to be mistaken for a real figure (she is a
“utopia,” says Rorty),  any less than the 17th century skeptic really existed:  both are
transitory figures depending on the shifts of vocabularies, i. e. on the shifts of the tools
allowing us to deal  with the new experiences and challenges we have to face in our
natural and social environment.
23 According to Rorty, cultural politics is a new definition of philosophy and it is at the same
time a way of understanding how new meanings, including new definitions of philosophy,
might eventually become commonsensical: “I want to argue that cultural politics should
replace ontology, and also that whether it should or not is itself a matter of cultural
politics.”14 Following the post-Sellarsian path of Robert Brandom,15 Rorty claims that the
old metaphysical questions giving birth to the various forms of skepticism, in order to be
properly  assessed,  have  to  be  placed  inside  the  social  context  of  intersubjective
justification: “All attempts to name an authority which is superior to that of society are
disguised moves in the game of cultural politics.”16 Philosophy is therefore at the same
time the subject and the object of cultural politics: its new identity is itself an element in
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the process  of  changing vocabularies,  but  this  process  is  not  meant  to  get  closer  to
objective truth or “real” morality. Philosophy is rather the way to face new experiences
and integrate them into the evolving network of our existing beliefs.
24 Again, the liberal ironist isn’t a mere problematic reminiscence of practical skepticism, as
it first seems to be, but rather, on the contrary, a step on the path leading to a real
emancipation from the classical problems of skepticism. Like every concept, it is a tool
designed for a special  and limited task,  i.e. getting rid of  the philosophical  (Platonic)
temptation to unify the individual  and the universal,  or to rephrase it  in the liberal
vocabulary  (which  is  just  one  useful  vocabulary  among  many  others),  to  unify  the
“private” and the “public.” It is therefore a mistake to see the private/public distinction
(and to criticize it) as a naïve return to a metaphysical dualism which is inconsistent with
Rorty’s  pragmatist  –  and  anti-dualist  –  commitments.17 Liberal  ironism  is  an
antifoundationalist conceptual  tool18 and,  as  such,  it  is  not  to  be  reified  as  Rorty’s
personal  final  stance:  just  as  Philosophy  and  the  Mirror  of  Nature was  an  attempt  at
providing new redescriptive tools of Philosophy’s status and task, Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity is  an attempt at  creating a redescriptive utopia about the relation between
philosophy and politics.  What has been hastily described as a “Humean turn”19 looks
rather,  after  closer  examination,  like  a  pragmatist  redescription  of  the  existence  of
philosophy in a liberal society. As such, it doesn’t contradict the pragmatist commitment
to fallibilism, but we have to understand that fallibilism here is about vocabularies, not
theories. Liberal irony may then be described as a revisable conceptual tool (fallibilism)
allowing us to use post-nietzschean skepticism (vocabulary) as a means to improve our
understanding of the contemporary political predicament of philosophy (experience). Put
differently, though Rorty doesn’t see skepticism as a relevant philosophical stance per se,
he claims that ironic skepsis may play a useful role in the social practice of “cultural
politics.”
25 Similarly, the “prophetic feminist”20 providing new words and new linguistic uses for
alternate  redescriptions  of  the  condition  of  women  is  just  another  transitional  role
allowing Rorty to get rid of an old vocabulary (abstract universalist egalitarianism) in
favor of a new one (historicist anti-essentialist feminism). Such a prophetic feminism is
no  longer  mere  ironism  but  has  learned  from  the  philosophical  and  political
consequences of the ironic stance.21 Whereas the ironist was still negatively affected by
the impossibility of reaching an objective truth or an ultimate justification (hence taking
the contingency of vocabularies for a sign of the precariousness of such vocabularies), the
feminist prophet provides “creative misuses of language”22 in order to turn the social
condition of  women toward a utopian state of  mind,  instead of  looking for  a  “true”
essence of the “eternal woman” and unmasking the lies and the illusions covering such a
hidden truth. In distinction to the ironist, the prophetic feminist isn’t influenced by some
kind of nostalgia for a lost truth; she is not even some kind of sophisticated self-reflective
skeptic captivated by her sharp sense of contingency, just a mature pragmatist thinker
who simply doesn’t care about skepticism (seen as a permanent philosophical problem)
anymore. The quest for universality has been replaced by the sense of hope, the sense of
an open future, of a still unpredictable evolution of vocabularies allowing people to deal
actively with the interests of the present time.
26 The cultural politician is neither a Cartesian inner mind desperately trying to reach the
outer world beyond the veil of her ideas, nor is she a mere ironist trying to stay aware of
the contingency of her own beliefs in order to adapt them to the anti-foundationalist
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climate of liberal life: she is rather a conceptual dramatist with a fallibilistic awareness of
the contingency of all possible redescriptions (including the ones using conceptual tools
such as modern skepticism or liberal ironism). She has emancipated her skepsis from its
reified  and  transitory  personifications  (Pyrrhonian  skeptic,  Humean skeptic,  liberal
ironist) and from the now anachronistic concerns of the outdated intellectual fashion
once termed skepticism. It is a mistake to regard Rorty’s philosophy as a problematic
revival of the Humean outlook, since it is now clear that philosophy as cultural politics
implies  that  every  intellectual  outlook  (including  the  Humean  one)  is  a  potential
philosophical tool designed for specific tasks. From a pragmatist point of view, skepticism
is neither a permanent challenge to be taken up, nor the fatal predicament of modern
humanity, but rather a set of roles which may prove more or less useful in the evolving
game of  cultural  politics.  This  is  what  Rorty’s  relation to  skepticism is  really  about:
beyond  the  simplistic  opposition  between  anti-skepticism  (including  classical
pragmatism) and skepticism, it is necessary to make place for a pragmatic skepsis which
constitutes the social  practice of philosophy, i.e.  the understanding of the permanent
shifts of the vocabularies we use to describe our culture, including the one allowing us to
define what philosophy’s relation to skepticism is really about.
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NOTES
1. On Rorty’s use of Kuhn in a Darwinian pragmatist view of human culture, see Rorty (1979:
322-333) and Rorty (1999, ch. 12).
2. On the critique of “intuitive realism,” see Rorty (1982: XXIX-XXXVII).
3. We  find  a  clear  diagnosis  on  “Rorty’s  skepticism”  in  Michael  Williams’  30th  anniversary
introduction of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature: “To his critics, Rorty is a skeptic, a relativist, an
irrationalist,  and a nihilist.  He is none of those things. Rorty is not an epistemological skeptic but
rather a skeptic about epistemology. A philosophical skeptic holds, or pretends to hold, that any
view  is  as  good  as  any  other.  Rorty  doesn’t  think  this  for  a  moment.  Rorty’s  view  is  that
skepticism (along with relativism, etc.) is the dark side of epistemology. Epistemology aims at a
wholesale justification of our beliefs about the world (with a resultant downgrading of beliefs
that resist appropriate grounding). Accordingly, skepticism is where you end up if you think that
epistemology  ought  to  work  but  doesn’t.  What  leads  to  skepticism  is  not  inadequate
epistemology but the very idea that knowledge, justification, and truth are objects of theory.”
(Rorty, 2009: xxvii).
4. See Tiercelin (2005).
5. Rorty (1979: 94 n. 8).
6. This  short  presentation  owes  much  to  Michael  Williams’  crystal-clear  sketch  of  Rorty’s
argument in Williams (2000).
7. Rorty’s  critique  of  Stroud’s  understanding  of  skepticism  is  to  be  found  in “Antiskeptical
Weapons: Michael Williams versus Donald Davidson” (Rorty, 1998: 153-156).
8. For a convincing sketch of modern « mentalism », see Habermas (2003: 177-180).
9. A  presentation  focused  on  the  practical  side  of  Pyrrhonism  is  provided  by  Hadot  (1995:
174-177).
10. Williams (1995: 363, n. 38).
11. Rorty (1998: 6).
12. Rorty (2007: 3).
13. Rorty (ibid.: ix-x).
14. Rorty (ibid.: 5).
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15. On the decisive influence of Brandom on Rorty, see “Robert Brandom on Social Practices and
Representations” in Rorty (1998: 122-137), “Cultural Politics and the Existence of God” in Rorty
(2007: 3-26) and “Some American Uses of Hegel,” in Welsch W. & Urewig K. (2003).
16. Rorty (2007: 8).
17. In  other  words,  it  is  misleading  to  view  Rorty’s  “partition  position”  as  an  inconsistent
attempt to create a  real partition between the private and the public  life  of  individuals  (see
Fraser, 1990, and Topper, 1995: 961), which would obviously contradict Rorty’s own strive to go
beyond  abstract dualisms  through  perpetual  redescriptions  of  human  culture.  In  a  recent
interview, Rorty clearly dismiss this objection, claiming the private/public dichotomy to be a
mere matter  of  vocabularies:  “I  don’t  think private  beliefs  can be  fenced off  from the public
sphere; they leak through, so to speak, and influence the way one behaves toward people. What I
had  in  mind  in  making  the  distinction  was  this:  the  language  of  citizenship,  of  public
responsibility,  of  participation in the affairs of the state,  is  not going to be an original,  self-
created language.” (Rorty, 2006: 50).
18. See Rorty (2006) “Ironism, in this context, means something close to antifoundationalism.”
19. Williams (2003: 74). Williams is right to claim that “the neo-Humean outlook involves finding
a kind of truth in skepticism. As a pragmatist, Rorty should never claim to find any such thing”
(Williams, 2003: 75). He is wrong to think that Rorty does find any truth in skepticism.
20. See “Feminism and Pragmatism” in Rorty (1998: 202-227).
21. To  use  Nietzschean  terms,  ironism  may  be  regarded  as  a  pragmatized  form  of  “passive
nihilism,” whereas prophetic feminism looks more like a form of “active nihilism.”
22. Rorty (1998:  204):  “One way to change instinctive emotional  reactions is  to  provide new
language that will facilitate new reactions. By ‘new language’ I mean not just new words but also
creative misuses of languages – familiar words used in ways that initially sound crazy. Something
traditionally regarded as a moral abomination can become an object of general satisfaction, or
conversely,  as  a  result  of  the  increased  popularity  of  an  alternate  description  of  what  is
happening.”
ABSTRACTS
In this paper, I address the issue of the consistency of Richard Rorty’s multi-layered approach of
skepticism,  examining  three  successive  steps  of  this  approach:  the  genealogical  critique  of
theoretical skepticism in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, the surprising revival of a skeptical
outlook  in  Contingency,  Irony,  and  Solidarity and  the  promising  sketch  of  a  pragmatist  skepsis
emancipated from skepticism in the last works dedicated to the restatement of philosophy as
“cultural  politics.”  According  to  some  critical  readers  of  Rorty,  there  is  a  tension,  if  not  a
contradiction, between Rorty’s early dismissal of the skeptical stance in the name of pragmatism
and the return of a “neo-Humean” stance in his political writings of the 1980’s. The aim of this
paper is to show that there is no such contradiction between these two orientations, provided
one keeps in  mind that  according to  Rorty,  philosophy is  about  creating,  strengthening and
undermining various descriptions of human culture. Rorty’s pragmatist redescriptions include
“conceptual characters” which have to be regarded as philosophical tools fulfilling specific tasks:
from this perspective, the liberal ironist is not to be considered as the final word of Rorty on
political philosophy, but rather as a transitory figure which allows the author of Contingency,
Irony,  and  Solidarity to  address  the  specific  problem  of  the  relation  between  philosophy  and
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politics  in  a  liberal  (anti-foundational)  society.  Therefore,  liberal  ironism  is  not  a  naive
commitment to skepticism which is inconsistent with the fallibilistic claims of pragmatism: the
best way of understanding it is to view it from the perspective of Rorty’s last works, i.e. from the
perspective  of  “cultural  politics,”  and  to  compare  it  to  other  philosophical  figures  fulfilling
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